

BOOK 1

CHAPTER 1

(1) Since we see that every city is some sort of partnership, and that every partnership is constituted for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what is held to be good), it is clear that all partnerships aim at some good, and that the partnership that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others does so particularly, and aims at the most authoritative good of all. This is what is called the city or the political partnership.

(2) Those who suppose that the same person is expert in political [rule], kingly [rule], managing the household and being a master [of slaves] do not argue rightly.¹ For they consider that each of these differs in the multitude or fewness [of those ruled] and not in kind—for example, [the ruler] of a few is a master, of more a household manager, and of still more an expert in political or kingly [rule]—the assumption being that there is no difference between a large household and a small city; and as for the experts in political and kingly [rule], they consider an expert in kingly [rule] one who has charge himself, and in political [rule] one who, on the basis of the precepts of this sort of science, rules and is ruled in turn.² But these things are not true. (3) This will be clear to those investigating in accordance with our normal sort of inquiry.³ For just as it is necessary elsewhere to divide a compound into its uncompound elements (for these are the smallest parts of the whole), so too by investigating what the city is composed of we shall gain a better view concerning these [kinds of rulers] as well, both as to how they differ from one another and as to whether there is some expertise characteristic of an art that can be acquired in connection with each of those mentioned.

CHAPTER 2

(1) Now in these matters as elsewhere it is by looking at how things develop naturally from the beginning that one may best study them. (2) First, then, there must of necessity be a conjunc-

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tion of persons who cannot exist without one another: on the one hand, male and female, for the sake of reproduction (which occurs not from intentional choice but—as is also the case with the other animals and plants—from a natural striving to leave behind another that is like oneself); on the other, the naturally ruling and ruled, on account of preservation. For that which can foresee with the mind is the naturally ruling and naturally mastering element, while that which can do these things with the body is the naturally ruled and slave; hence the same thing is advantageous for the master and slave. (3) Now the female is distinguished by nature from the slave. For nature makes nothing in an economizing spirit, as smiths make the Delphic knife,⁴ but one thing with a view to one thing; and each instrument would perform most finely if it served one task rather than many. (4) The barbarians, though, have the same arrangement for female and slave. The reason for this is that they have no naturally ruling element; with them, the partnership [of man and woman] is that of female slave and male slave. This is why the poets say “it is fitting for Greeks to rule barbarians”⁵—the assumption being that barbarian and slave are by nature the same thing.

(5) From these two partnerships, then, the household first arose, and Hesiod's verse is rightly spoken: “first a house, and woman, and ox for ploughing”⁶—for poor persons have an ox instead of a servant. The household is the partnership constituted by nature for [the needs of] daily life; Charondas calls its members “peers of the mess,” Epimenides of Crete “peers of the manger.”⁷ The first partnership arising from [the union of] several households and for the sake of nondaily needs is the village. (6) By nature the village seems to be above all an extension of the household. Its members some call “milk-peers”; they are “the children and the children's children.”⁸ This is why cities were at first under kings, and nations are even now. For those who joined together were already under kings: every household was under the eldest as king, and so also were the extensions [of the household constituting the village] as a result of kinship. (7) This is what Homer meant when he says that “each acts as law to his children and wives”; for [men] were scattered and used to dwell in this manner in ancient times.⁹ And it is for this reason that all assert that the gods are under a king—because they themselves are under kings now, or were in ancient times. For human beings assimilate not only the looks of the gods to themselves, but their ways of life as well.

(8) The partnership arising from [the union of] several villages that is complete is the city. It reaches a level of full self-sufficiency,

so to speak; and while coming into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well. Every city, therefore, exists by nature, if such also are the first partnerships. For the city is their end, and nature is an end: what each thing is—for example, a human being, a horse, or a household—when its coming into being is complete is, we assert, the nature of that thing. (9) Again, that for the sake of which [a thing exists], or the end, is what is best; and self-sufficiency is an end and what is best.

From these things it is evident, then, that the city belongs among the things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. He who is without a city through nature rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man; he is “without clan, without law, without hearth,” like the person reproved by Homer; (10) for the one who is such by nature has by this fact a desire for war, as if he were an isolated piece in a game of chess.¹⁰ That man is much more a political animal than any kind of bee or any herd animal is clear. For, as we assert, nature does nothing in vain; and man alone among the animals has speech. (11) The voice indeed indicates the painful or pleasant, and hence is present in other animals as well; for their nature has come this far, that they have a perception of the painful and pleasant and indicate these things to each other. But speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust. (12) For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of this sort]; and partnership in these things is what makes a household and a city.

The city is thus prior by nature to the household and to each of us. (13) For the whole must of necessity be prior to the part; for if the whole [body] is destroyed there will not be a foot or a hand, unless in the sense that the term is similar (as when one speaks of a hand made of stone), but the thing itself will be defective. Everything is defined by its task and its power, and if it is no longer the same in these respects it should not be spoken of in the same way, but only as something similarly termed. (14) That the city is both by nature and prior to each individual, then, is clear. For if the individual when separated [from it] is not self-sufficient, he will be in a condition similar to that of the other parts in relation to the whole. One who is incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.

(15) Accordingly, there is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this sort of partnership. And yet the one who first constituted [a city] is responsible for the greatest of goods. For just as man is

the best of the animals when completed, when separated from law and adjudication he is the worst of all. (16) For injustice is harshest when it is furnished with arms; and man is born naturally possessing arms for [the use of] prudence and virtue which are nevertheless very susceptible to being used for their opposites. This is why, without virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage [of the animals], and the worst with regard to sex and food.¹¹ [The virtue of] justice is a thing belonging to the city. For adjudication is an arrangement of the political partnership,¹² and adjudication is judgment as to what is just.

CHAPTER 3

(1) Since it is evident out of what parts the city is constituted, it is necessary first to speak of household management; for every city is composed of households. The parts of household management correspond to the parts out of which the household itself is constituted. Now the complete household is made up of slaves and free persons. Since everything is to be sought for first in its smallest elements, and the first and smallest parts of the household are master, slave, husband, wife, father, and children, three things must be investigated to determine what each is and what sort of thing it ought to be. (2) These are expertise in mastery, in marital [rule] (there is no term for the union of man and woman), and thirdly in parental [rule]¹³ (this too has not been assigned a term of its own). (3) So much, then, for the three we spoke of. There is a certain part of it, however, which some hold to be [identical with] household management, and others its greatest part; how the matter really stands has to be studied. I am speaking of what is called business expertise.

Let us speak first about master and slave, so that we may see at the same time what relates to necessary needs and whether we cannot acquire something in the way of knowledge about these things that is better than current conceptions. (4) For some hold that mastery is a kind of science, and that managing the household, mastery, and expertise in political and kingly [rule] are the same, as we said at the beginning. Others hold that exercising mastery is against nature; for [as they believe] it is by law that one person is slave and another free, there being no difference by nature, and hence it is not just, since it rests on force.

CHAPTER 4

(1) Now possessions are a part of the household, and expertise in acquiring possessions a part of household management (for without the necessary things it is impossible either to live or to live well); and just as the specialized arts must of necessity have their proper instruments if their work is to be performed, so too must the expert household manager. (2) Now of instruments some are inanimate and others animate—the pilot's rudder, for example, is an inanimate one, but his lookout an animate one; for the subordinate is a kind of instrument for the arts. A possession too, then, is an instrument for life, and one's possessions are the multitude of such instruments; and the slave is a possession of the animate sort. Every subordinate, moreover, is an instrument that wields many instruments, (3) for if each of the instruments were able to perform its work on command or by anticipation, as they assert those of Daedalus did, or the tripods of Hephaestus (which the poet says "of their own accord came to the gods' gathering"),¹⁴ so that shuttles would weave themselves and picks play the lyre, master craftsmen would no longer have a need for subordinates, or masters for slaves. (4) Now the instruments mentioned are productive instruments, but a possession is an instrument of action. For from the shuttle comes something apart from the use of it, while from clothing or a bed the use alone. Further, since production and action differ in kind and both require instruments, these must of necessity reflect the same difference. (5) Life is action, not production; the slave is therefore a subordinate in matters concerning action.

A possession is spoken of in the same way as a part. A part is not only part of something else, but belongs wholly to something else; similarly with a possession. Accordingly, while the master is only master of the slave and does not belong to him, the slave is not only slave to the master but belongs wholly to him.

(6) What the nature of the slave is and what his capacity, then, is clear from these things. For one who does not belong to himself by nature but is another's, though a human being, is by nature a slave; a human being is another's who, though a human being, is a possession; and a possession is an instrument of action and separable [from its owner].

CHAPTER 5

(1) Whether anyone is of this sort by nature or not, and whether it is better and just for anyone to be a slave or not, but rather all slavery is against nature, must be investigated next. It is not difficult either to discern [the answer] by reasoning or to learn it from what actually happens. (2) Ruling and being ruled belong not only among things necessary but also among things advantageous. And immediately from birth certain things diverge, some toward being ruled, others toward ruling. There are many kinds both of ruling and ruled [things], and the better rule is always that over ruled [things] that are better, for example over a human being rather than a beast; (3) for the work performed by the better is better, and wherever something rules and something is ruled there is a certain work belonging to these together. For whatever is constituted out of a number of things—whether continuous or discrete—and becomes a single common thing always displays a ruling and a ruled element; (4) this is something that animate things derive from all of nature, for even in things that do not share in life there is a sort of rule, for example in a harmony. But these matters perhaps belong to a more external sort of investigation.¹⁵ But an animal is the first thing constituted out of soul and body, of which the one is the ruling element by nature, the other the ruled. (5) It is in things whose condition is according to nature that one ought particularly to investigate what is by nature, not in things that are defective. Thus the human being to be studied is one whose state is best both in body and in soul—in him this is clear; for in the case of the depraved, or those in a depraved condition, the body is often held to rule the soul on account of their being in a condition that is bad and unnatural.

(6) It is then in an animal, as we were saying, that one can first discern both the sort of rule characteristic of a master and political rule. For the soul rules the body with the rule characteristic of a master, while intellect rules appetite with political and kingly rule; and this makes it evident that it is according to nature and advantageous for the body to be ruled by the soul, and the passionate part [of the soul] by intellect and the part having reason, while it is harmful to both if the relation is equal or reversed. (7) The same holds with respect to man and the other animals: tame animals have a better nature than wild ones, and it is better for all of them to be ruled by man, since in this way their preservation is ensured. Further, the relation of male to female is by na-

ture a relation of superior to inferior and ruler to ruled. The same must of necessity hold in the case of human beings generally.

(8) Accordingly, those who are as different [from other men] as the soul from the body or man from beast—and they are in this state if their work is the use of the body, and if this is the best that can come from them—are slaves by nature. For them it is better to be ruled in accordance with this sort of rule, if such is the case for the other things mentioned. (9) For he is a slave by nature who is capable of belonging to another—which is also why he belongs to another—and who participates in reason only to the extent of perceiving it, but does not have it. (The other animals, not perceiving reason, obey their passions.¹⁶) Moreover, the need for them differs only slightly: bodily assistance in the necessary things is forthcoming from both, from slaves and from tame animals alike.

(10) Nature indeed wishes to make the bodies of free persons and slaves different as well [as their souls]—those of the latter strong with a view to necessary needs, those of the former straight and useless for such tasks, but useful with a view to a political way of life (which is itself divided between the needs of war and those of peace); yet the opposite often results, some having the bodies of free persons while others have the souls. It is evident, at any rate, that if they were to be born as different only¹⁷ in body as the images of the gods, everyone would assert that those not so favored merited being their slaves. (11) But if this is true in the case of the body, it is much more justifiable to make this distinction in the case of the soul; yet it is not as easy to see the beauty of the soul as it is that of the body. That some persons are free and others slaves by nature, therefore, and that for these slavery is both advantageous and just, is evident.

CHAPTER 6

(1) That those who assert the opposite are in a certain manner correct, however, is not difficult to see. Slavery and the slave are spoken of in a double sense. There is also a sort of slave or enslaved person according to law, the law being a certain agreement by which things conquered in war are said to belong to the conquerors. (2) This [claim of] justice is challenged by many of those conversant with the laws—as they would challenge an orator—on a motion of illegality,¹⁸ on the grounds that it is a terrible thing if

what yields to force is to be enslaved and ruled by what is able to apply force and is superior in power. And there are some of the wise as well who hold this opinion, though some hold the other. (3) The cause of this dispute—and what makes the arguments converge—is that virtue, once it obtains equipment, is in a certain manner particularly able to apply force, and the dominant element is always preeminent in something that is good, so that it is held that there is no force without virtue, and that the dispute concerns only the justice of the matter; (4) for on this account some hold that justice consists in benevolence, while the others hold that this very thing, the rule of the superior, is just. At any rate, if these arguments are set on one side, the other arguments—which assume that what is better in virtue ought not to rule or be master—have neither strength nor persuasiveness.¹⁹ (5) Those who regard the slavery that results from war as just adhere wholly, as they suppose, to a sort of justice (for law is just in a certain sense); yet at the same time they deny [implicitly that it is in fact always just]. For the beginnings of wars are not always just, and no one would assert that someone not meriting enslavement ought ever to be a slave. Otherwise, the result will be that those held to be the best born will become slaves and the offspring of slaves if they happen to be captured and sold. (6) Accordingly, they do not want to speak of these as slaves, but rather of barbarians. When they say this, however, they are in search of nothing other than the slave by nature of which we spoke at the beginning; for they must necessarily assert that there are some persons who are everywhere slaves, and others who are so nowhere. (7) It is the same way with good birth as well; for they consider themselves well born not only among their own but everywhere, but barbarians only at home—the assumption being that there is something well born and free simply, and something not simply [but relatively], as Theodectes' Helen says:

As offshoot of divine roots on either side
Who would dare call me serving-maid?²⁰

(8) When they speak in this way, it is by nothing other than virtue or vice that they define what is slave and what is free, who well born and who ill born. For they claim that from the good should come someone good, just as a human being comes from a human being and a beast from beasts. But while nature wishes to do this, it is often unable to. (9) That there is some reason in the dispute, therefore, and that it is not [simply] the case that the ones are slaves by nature and the others free, is clear; and also that such a distinction does exist for some, where it is advantageous as well

as just for the one to be enslaved and the other to be master; and that the one ought to be ruled and other to rule, and to rule by the sort of rule that is natural for them, which is mastery, (10) while bad rule is disadvantageous for both. For the same thing is advantageous for the part and the whole and for body and soul, and the slave is a sort of part of the master—a part of his body, as it were, animate yet separate. There is thus a certain advantage—and even affection of slave and master for one another—for those [slaves] who merit being such by nature; but for those who do not merit it in this way but [who are slaves] according to law and by force, the opposite is the case.

CHAPTER 7

(1) It is evident from these things as well that mastery and political [rule] are not the same thing and that all the sorts of rule are not the same as one another, as some assert. For the one sort is over those free by nature, the other over slaves; and household management is monarchy (for every household is run by one alone), while political rule is over free and equal persons. (2) Now the master is so called not according to a science [he possesses] but through being a certain sort, and similarly with the slave and the free person. Yet there could be a science characteristic both of mastery and of slavery. The science characteristic of slavery would be the sort of thing provided through the education offered by the fellow in Syracuse—for someone there used to receive pay for teaching slave boys their regular serving chores; (3) and there might be additional learning in such matters, for example in cookery and other service of this type. For certain works are more honored or more necessary than others, and as the proverb has it, “slave before slave, master before master.”²¹ (4) All things of this sort, then, are sciences characteristic of slavery; but the science characteristic of mastery is expertise in using slaves, since the master is what he is not in the acquiring of slaves but in the use of them. This science has nothing great or dignified about it: the master must know how to command the things that the slave must know how to do. (5) Hence for those to whom it is open not to be bothered with such things, an overseer assumes this prerogative, while they themselves engage in politics or philosophy. Expertise in acquiring [slaves] is different from both of these—that is, the just sort of acquiring, which is like a certain kind of expertise in

Should we not be able to rule over persons?
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war or hunting. Concerning slave and master, then, let the discussion stand thus.

CHAPTER 8

(1) But let us examine generally, in accordance with our normal sort of approach, possessions as such and expertise in business, since the slave too turned out to be a part of one's possessions. In the first place, then, one might raise the question whether expertise in business is the same as expertise in household management, a part of it, or subordinate to it; and if subordinate, whether it is so in the way expertise in making shuttles is to expertise in weaving, or in the way expertise in casting bronze is to expertise in sculpture. For these are not subordinate in the same way, but the one provides instruments, the other the matter. (2) (By the matter I mean the substance out of which some work is performed—for example, wool for the weaver or bronze for the sculptor.) Now it is clear that expertise in household management is not the same as expertise in business, for it belongs to the latter to supply and the former to use. For what is the expertise that uses the things in the house if not expertise in household management? But whether expertise in business is a part of it or different in kind is a matter of dispute. (3) For if it belongs to the expert businessman to discern how to get goods and possessions, and if possessions and wealth encompass many parts, [one must consider] in the first place whether expertise in farming is part of business expertise²² or different in kind, and [whether this is the case for] the concern with sustenance generally and the possessions connected with it. (4) There are indeed many kinds of sustenance, and therefore many ways of life both of animals and of human beings. For it is impossible to live without sustenance, so that the differences in sustenance have made the ways of life of animals differ. (5) For of beasts some live in herds and others scattered—whichever is advantageous for their sustenance, on account of some of them being carnivorous, some herbivorous, and some omnivorous; so that it is with a view to their convenience and their predilections in these matters that nature has determined their ways of life. And because the same thing is not pleasant to each [species of animal] according to nature but different things to different [species], among the carnivorous and the herbivorous themselves their ways of life differ from one another. (6) The same is the case for human

beings as well; for there are great differences in their ways of life. The idlest are nomads: they derive sustenance from tame animals without exertion and amid leisure, though as it is necessary for their herds to move about on account of their pastures, they are compelled to follow along with them, as if they were farming a living farm. (7) Others live from hunting, and different sorts from different sorts of hunting. Some, for example, live from piracy; others from fishing, if they dwell near lakes, marshes, rivers, or a sea that is suitable; others from birds or wild beasts. But the type of human being that is most numerous lives from the land and from cultivated crops.

(8) The ways of life are, then, about this many, or at least those which involve self-generated work and do not supply sustenance through exchange and commerce: the way of life of the nomad, the farmer, the pirate, the fisher, and the hunter. There are also some who live pleasantly by combining several of these in order to compensate for the shortcomings of one way of life, where it happens to be deficient with regard to being self-sufficient. For example, some combine the nomad's with the pirate's, some the farmer's with the hunter's, and similarly with others as well—they pass their time in the manner that need [together with pleasure] compels them to. (9) Now possessions of this sort are evidently given by nature itself to all [animals], both immediately from birth and when they have reached completion. (10) For at birth from the very beginning some animals provide at the same time as much sustenance as is adequate until the offspring can supply itself—for example, those that give birth to larvae or eggs; while those that give birth to live offspring have sustenance for these in themselves for a certain period—the natural substance called milk. (11) It is clear in a similar way, therefore, that for grown things as well one must suppose both that plants exist for the sake of animals and that the other animals exist for the sake of human beings—the tame animals, both for use and sustenance, and most if not all of the wild animals, for sustenance and other assistance, in order that clothing and other instruments may be got from them.²³ (12) If, then, nature makes nothing that is incomplete or purposeless, nature must necessarily have made all of these for the sake of human beings.

Hence expertise in war will also be in some sense a natural form of acquisitive expertise; for one part of it is expertise in hunting, which should be used with a view both to beasts and to those human beings who are naturally suited to be ruled but unwilling—this sort of war being by nature just. (13) One kind of acquisitive expertise, then, is by nature a part of expertise in

household management, and must either be available or be supplied by the latter so as to be available—[expertise in acquiring] those goods a store of which is both necessary for life and useful for partnership in a city or a household.²⁴ (14) At any rate, it would seem to be these things that make up genuine wealth. For self-sufficiency in possessions of this sort with a view to a good life is not limitless, as Solon asserts it to be in his poem: "of wealth no boundary lies revealed to men."²⁵ (15) There is such a boundary, just as in the other arts; for there is no art that has an instrument that is without limit either in number or in size, and wealth is the multitude of instruments belonging to expert household managers and political [rulers]. That there is a natural expertise in acquisition for household managers and political [rulers], then, and the cause of this, is clear.

CHAPTER 9

(1) But there is another type of acquisitive expertise that they particularly call—and justifiably so—expertise in business, on account of which there is held to be no limit to wealth and possessions. This is considered by many to be one and the same as the sort mentioned because of the resemblance between them; and while it is not the same as the one spoken of, it is not far from it either. The one is by nature, while the other is not by nature but arises rather through a certain experience and art.

(2) Concerning this, let us take the following as our beginning. Every possession has a double use. Both of these uses belong to it as such, but not in the same way, the one being proper and the other not proper to the thing. In the case of footwear, for example, one can wear it or one can exchange it. Both of these are uses of footwear; (3) for the one exchanging footwear with someone who needs it in return for money or sustenance uses footwear as footwear, but not in respect of its proper use; for it did not come to be for the sake of exchange. The same is the case concerning other possessions as well. (4) For there is an expertise in exchange for all things; it arises in the first place from something that is according to nature—the fact that human beings have either more or fewer things than what is adequate. Thus it is also clear that expertise in commerce does not belong by nature to expertise in business; for it was necessary to make an exchange in order to obtain what was adequate for them. (5) In the first partnership,

then—that is, the household—it is evident that exchange has no function, but only when the partnership has already become more numerous. For those [in the household] were partners in their own things, while persons separated [into different households] were partners in many things of others as well, and it was necessary to make transfers of these things according to their needs, as many barbarian nations still do, through exchange. (6) For they exchange useful things for one another and nothing besides—giving, for example, wine and accepting grain, and similarly for other such things. This sort of expertise in exchange is not contrary to nature, nor is it any kind of expertise in business, for it existed in order to support natural self-sufficiency. (7) However, the latter arose from it reasonably enough. For as the assistance of foreigners became greater in importing what they were in need of and exporting what was in surplus, the use of money was necessarily devised. (8) For the things necessary by nature are not in each case easily portable; hence with a view to exchanges they made a compact with one another to give and accept something which was itself one of the useful things and could be used flexibly to suit the needs of life, such as iron and silver and whatever else might be of this sort. At first this was something [with its value] determined simply by size and weight, but eventually they impressed a mark on it in order to be relieved of having to measure it, the mark being put on as an indication of the amount. (9) Once a supply of money came into being as a result of such necessary exchange, then, the other kind of expertise in business arose—that is, commerce. At first this probably existed in a simple fashion, while later through experience it became more a matter of art—[the art of discerning] what and how to exchange in order to make the greatest profit. (10) It is on this account that expertise in business is held to be particularly connected with money, and to have as its task the ability to discern what will provide a given amount [of it]; for it is held to be productive of wealth and goods. Indeed, they often define wealth as a given amount of money, since this is what expertise in business or commerce is connected with. (11) At other times, however, money seems to be something nonsensical and [to exist] altogether [by] law, and in no way by nature, because when changed by its users it is worth nothing and is not useful with a view to any of the necessary things; and it will often happen that one who is wealthy in money will go in want of necessary sustenance. Yet it would be absurd if wealth were something one could have in abundance and die of starvation—like the Midas of the fable, when everything set before him turned into gold on account of the greediness of his

prayer. (12) Hence they seek another [definition] of wealth and expertise in business, and correctly so. For the expertise in business and the wealth that is according to nature is something different: this is expertise in household management, while the other is commercial expertise, which is productive of wealth not in every way but through trafficking in goods, and is held to be connected with money, since money is the medium and goal of exchange. (13) And the wealth deriving from this sort of business expertise is indeed without limit. For just as expertise in medicine has no limit with respect to being healthy, or any of the other arts with respect to its end (for this is what they particularly wish to accomplish), while there is a limit with respect to what exists for the sake of the end (since the end is a limit in the case of all of them), so with this sort of expertise in business there is no limit with respect to the end, and the end is wealth of this sort and possession of goods. (14) But of expertise in household management as distinguished from expertise in business there is a limit; for that is not the work of expertise in household management. Thus in one way it appears necessary that there be a limit to all wealth; yet if we look at what actually occurs we see that the opposite happens—all who engage in business increase their money without limit. (15) The cause of this is the nearness to one another of these [forms of expertise in business]. For they converge in the matter of use, the same thing being used in the case of either sort of expertise in business. For possessions serve the same use,²⁶ though not in the same respect, but in the one case the end is increase, in the other something else. So some hold that this is the work of expertise in household management, and they proceed on the supposition that they should either preserve or increase without limit their property in money. (16) The cause of this state is that they are serious about living, but not about living well; and since that desire of theirs is without limit, they also desire what is productive of unlimited things. Even those who also aim at living well seek what conduces to bodily gratifications, and since this too appears to be available in and through possessions, their pursuits are wholly connected with business, and this is why the other kind of business expertise has arisen. (17) For as gratification consists in excess, they seek the sort that is productive of the excess characteristic of gratification; and if they are unable to supply it through expertise in business, they attempt this in some other fashion, using each sort of capacity in a way not according to nature. For it belongs to courage to produce not goods but confidence; nor does this belong to military or medical expertise, but it belongs to the former to produce victory, to the latter, health. (18) But all of

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CHAPTER 10

(1) It is also clear what the answer is to the question raised at the beginning whether business expertise belongs to the expert household manager or political [ruler] or not, but should rather be available to him. For just as political expertise does not create human beings but makes use of them after receiving them from nature, so also should nature provide land or sea or something else for sustenance, while it befits the household manager to have what comes from those things in the state it should be in. (2) For it does not belong to expertise in weaving to make wool, but to make use of it, and to know what sort is usable and suitable or poor and unsuitable. Otherwise one might raise the question why expertise in business should be a part of household management but not medical expertise, since those in the household ought to be healthy, just as they must live or do any other necessary thing. (3) But just as seeing about health does indeed belong to the household manager and the ruler in a sense, but in another sense not but rather to the doctor, so in the case of goods it belongs to the household manager in a sense, but in another sense not but rather to the subordinate expertise. This should be available above all, as was said before, by nature. For it is a work of nature to provide sustenance to the newly born, everything deriving sustenance from what remains of that from which it is born. (4) Expertise in business relative to crops and animals is thus natural for all. But since it is twofold, as we said, part of it being commerce and part expertise in household management, the latter necessary and praised, while expertise in exchange is justly blamed since it is not according to nature but involves taking from others, usury is most reasonably hated because one's possessions derive from money itself and not from that for which it was supplied. (5) For it came into being for the sake of exchange, but interest actually creates more of it. And

it is from this that it gets its name: offspring are similar to those who give birth to them, and interest is money born of money.²⁷ So of the sorts of business this is the most contrary to nature.

CHAPTER 11

(1) Since we have discussed adequately what relates to knowledge, what relates to practice must be treated. All things of this sort have room for a free sort of study, but experience in them is a necessity. The useful parts of expertise in business are: to be experienced regarding livestock—what sorts are most profitable in which places and under what conditions (for example, what sort of horses or cattle or sheep ought to be kept, and similarly with the other animals, (2) for one needs to be experienced as regards those that are most profitable both compared with one another and in particular places, since different kinds thrive in different areas); next, regarding farming, both of grain and fruit; and finally, regarding beekeeping and the raising of other animals, whether fish or fowl, from which it is possible to derive benefit. (3) Of expertise in business in its most proper sense, then, these are the parts and primary elements. Of expertise in exchange the greatest part is trade, of which there are three parts: provisioning the ship, transport, and marketing (these differ from each other by the fact that some are safer while others provide greater remuneration); the second is moneylending; and the third is wage labor, (4) of which one sort involves the vulgar arts, while the other [is performed by] those who lack any art but are useful only for their bodies. There is a third kind of expertise in business between this and the first, since it has some part both of the sort that is according to nature and of expertise in exchange: [this deals with] things from the earth and unfruitful but useful things that grow from the earth, [and includes activities] such as lumbering and every sort of mining (5) (this now encompasses many different types, as there are many kinds of things mined from the earth).

A general account has now been given of each of these things; a detailed and exact discussion would be useful in undertaking the works themselves, but to spend much time on such things is crude. (6) The most artful of these works are those which involve chance the least; the most vulgar, those in which the body is most damaged; the most slavish, those in which the body is most used; the most ignoble, those which are least in need of virtue.

(7) Since some have written on these matters—as Chares of Paros and Apollodoros of Lemnos on farming both of grain and fruit, for example, and others on other things—they may be studied there by anyone concerned with them; but, in addition, what has been said in various places concerning the ways some have succeeded in business should be collected.²⁸ (8) For all these things are useful for those who honor expertise in business. There is, for example, the [way] of Thales of Miletus.²⁹ This is a business scheme which is attributed to him on account of his wisdom, yet it happens to be general in application. (9) For they say that when some on account of his poverty reproached him with the uselessness of philosophy, Thales, observing through his knowledge of astronomy that there would be a good harvest of olives, was able during the winter to raise a small sum of money to place in deposit on all the olive presses in both Miletus and Chios, which he could hire at a low rate because no one was competing with him; then, when the season came, and many of them were suddenly in demand at the same time, he hired them out on what terms he pleased and collected a great deal in the way of funds, thus showing how easy it is for philosophers to become wealthy if they so wish, but it is not this they are serious about. (10) Thales, then, is said to have made a display of his wisdom in this manner, though, as we said, this piece of business expertise is universal, if someone is able to establish a monopoly for himself. Thus even some cities raise revenue in this way when they are short of funds; they establish a monopoly on things being sold. (11) In Sicily, a man used some money deposited with him to buy all the iron from the iron foundries, and when traders came from their trading places he alone had it to sell; and though he did not greatly increase the price, he made a hundred talents' profit out of an original fifty. (12) When Dionysius heard of this, he ordered him to take his funds and leave Syracuse, on the grounds that he had discovered a way of raising revenue that was harmful to Dionysius' own affairs.³⁰ Yet the insight was the same as that of Thales, for both artfully arranged a monopoly for themselves. (13) It is useful for political [rulers] also to be familiar with these things. For many cities need business and revenues of this sort, just as households do, yet more so. Thus there are some even among those engaged in politics who are concerned only with these matters.

CHAPTER 12

(1) Since there are three parts of expertise in household management—expertise in mastery, which was spoken of earlier, expertise in paternal [rule], and expertise in marital [rule]—[the latter two must now be taken up. These differ fundamentally from the former, since one ought]³¹ to rule a wife and children as free persons, though it is not the same mode of rule in each case, the wife being ruled in political, the children in kingly fashion. For the male, unless constituted in some respect contrary to nature, is by nature more expert at leading than the female, and the elder and complete than the younger and incomplete. (2) In most political offices, it is true, there is an alternation of ruler and ruled, since they tend by their nature to be on an equal footing and to differ in nothing; all the same, when one rules and the other is ruled, [the ruler] seeks to establish differences in external appearance, forms of address, and prerogatives, as in the story Amasis told about his footpad.³² The male always stands thus in relation to the female. (3) But rule over the children is kingly. For the one who generates is ruler on the basis of both affection and age, which is the very mark of kingly rule. Homer thus spoke rightly of Zeus when he addressed as “father of men and gods” the king of them all. For by nature the king should be different, but he should be of the same stock; and this is the case of the elder in relation to the younger and the one who generates to the child.

CHAPTER 13

(1) It is evident, then, that household management gives more serious attention to human beings than to inanimate possessions, to the virtue of these than that of possessions (which we call wealth), and to the virtue of free persons rather than that of slaves. (2) First, then, one might raise a question concerning slaves: whether there is a certain virtue belonging to a slave besides the virtues of an instrument and a servant and more honorable than these, such as moderation and courage and justice and the other dispositions of this sort, or whether there is none besides the bodily services. (3) Questions arise either way, for if there is [such a virtue], how will they differ from free persons? But if there is not, though they are human beings and participate in reason, it is odd. Nearly the

same question arises concerning a woman and a child, whether there are virtues belonging to these as well—whether the woman should be moderate and courageous and just, and whether a child is [capable of being] licentious and moderate or not. (4) And in general, then, this must be investigated concerning the ruled by nature and the ruler, whether virtue is the same or different. For if both should share in gentlemanliness, why should the one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? For it is not possible for them to differ by greater and less, since being ruled and ruling differ in kind, not by greater and less; (5) but that one should [have such virtue] and the other not would be surprising. For unless the ruler is moderate and just, how will he rule finely? And unless the ruled is, how will he be ruled finely? For if he is licentious and cowardly he will perform none of his duties. It is evident, then, that both must of necessity share in virtue, but that there are differences in their virtue, as there are in [that of] those who are by nature ruled. (6) Consideration of the soul guides us straightway [to this conclusion]. For in this there is by nature a ruling and a ruled element, and we assert there is a different virtue of each—that is, of the element having reason and of the irrational element. It is clear, then, that the same thing holds in the other cases as well. Thus by nature most things are ruling and ruled. (7) For the free person rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child in different ways. The parts of the soul are present in all, but they are present in a different way. The slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element; the female has it but it lacks authority; the child has it but it is incomplete. (8) It is to be supposed that the same necessarily holds concerning the virtues of character: all must share in them, but not in the same way, but to each in relation to his own work. Hence the ruler must have complete virtue of character (for a work belongs in an absolute sense to the master craftsman, and reason is a master craftsman); while each of the others must have as much as falls to him. (9) It is thus evident that there is a virtue of character that belongs to all these mentioned, and that the moderation of a woman and a man is not the same, nor their courage or justice, as Socrates supposed, but that there is a ruling and a serving courage, and similarly with the other virtues. (10) This is further clear if we investigate the matter in more detail. For those who say in a general way that virtue is a good condition of the soul or acting correctly or something of this sort deceive themselves. Those who enumerate the virtues, like Gorgias, do much better than those who define it in this way.³³ (11) One should thus consider that matters stand with everyone as the poet said of woman: “to a woman silence is an

ornament,"³⁴ though this is not the case for a man. Since the child is incomplete, it is clear that its virtue too is not its own as relating to itself, but as relating to its end and the person leading it. (12) The same is true of that of the slave in relation to a master. We laid it down that the slave is useful with respect to the necessary things, so that he clearly needs only a small amount of virtue—as much as will prevent him from falling short in his work through licentiousness or cowardice. One might raise the question whether, if what has just been said is true, artisans too will need virtue, since they often fall short in their work through licentiousness. (13) Or is the case very different? For the slave is a partner in [the master's] life, while the other is more remote, and shares in virtue only so far as he also shares in slavery. For the vulgar artisan is under a special sort of slavery, and while the slave belongs among those [persons or things that are] by nature, no shoemaker does, nor any of the other artisans. (14) It is evident, therefore, that the master should be responsible for [instilling] this sort of virtue in the slave; he is not merely someone possessing an expertise in mastery which instructs the slave in his work. Those who deny reason to slaves and assert that commands only should be used with them do not argue rightly: admonition is to be used with slaves more than with children. (15) But concerning these matters let our discussion stand thus. Concerning husband and wife and children and father and the sort of virtue that is connected with each of these, and what is and what is not fine in their relations with one another and how one should pursue what is well and avoid the bad, these things must necessarily be addressed in the [discourses] connected with the regimes.³⁵ For since the household as a whole is a part of the city, and these things of the household, and one should look at the virtue of the part in relation to the virtue of the whole, both children and women must necessarily be educated looking to the regime, at least if it makes any difference with a view to the city's being excellent that both its children and its women are excellent. (16) But it necessarily makes a difference: women are a part amounting to a half of the free persons, and from the children come those who are partners in the regime. So since there has been discussion of these matters, and we must speak elsewhere of those remaining, let us leave off the present discourses as having reached an end and make another beginning to the argument. Let us investigate in the first instance the views that have been put forward about the best regime.

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BOOK 2

CHAPTER 1

(1) Since it is our intention to study the sort of political partnership that is superior to all for those capable of living as far as possible in the manner one would pray for, we should also investigate other regimes, both those in use in some of the cities that are said to be well managed and any others spoken about by certain persons that are held to be in a fine condition, in order that both what is correct in their condition and what is useful may be seen—and further, that to seek something apart from them may not be held wholly to belong to those who wish to act the sophist, but that we may be held to enter into this inquiry because those regimes now available are in fact not in a fine condition. (2) We must make a beginning that is the natural beginning for this investigation. It is necessary that all the citizens be partners either in everything, or in nothing, or in some things but not in others. Now it is evident that to be partners in nothing is impossible; for the regime is a certain sort of partnership, and it is necessary in the first instance to be partners in a location: a single city occupies a single location, and the citizens are partners in the single city. (3) But, of the things in which there can be participation, is it better for the city that is going to be finely administered to participate in all of them, or is it better to participate in some but not in others? For it is possible for the citizens to be partners with one another in respect to children and women and property, as in the *Republic* of Plato; for there Socrates asserts that children and women and property should be common.¹ Which is better, then, the condition that exists now or one based on the law that is described in the *Republic*?

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CHAPTER 2

(1) Having women common to all involves many difficulties; but a particular difficulty is that the reason Socrates gives as to why there should be legislation of this sort evidently does not result

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